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RECENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law - Voluntariness of Confession
- Rules for Determining
Petitioner, a prisoner sentenced to death in a Texas prosecution,
applied to a federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus. Rely-
ing on Jackson v. Denno, petitioner contended his constitutional
rights had been violated because the trial judge did not make a pre-
liminary finding, out of the presence of the jury, that petitioner's
confession was voluntary. The federal court examined the trial record
and found that petitioner had not requested to be allowed to testify
in regard to voluntariness of his confession out of the presence of the
jury. At an evidentiary hearing held by the federal court, the state
trial judge testified he would not have admitted the confession unless
he had been satisfied in his own mind that it had been voluntarily
given. Held: Constitutional requirements for admission of confes-
sions are met if the trial judge makes a clear-cut, preliminary de-
termination that the confession was voluntarily given and, absent
a request by the defendant to testify out of the presence of the jury,
presence of the jury during the judge's determination does not invali-
date the proceeding. Smith v. Texas, 236 F. Supp. 857 (S.D. Tex.
1964).
Convicted prisoners, hopeful of freedom, will find Smith one of
the more discouraging of the recent cases forming the "fall-out"
from Jackson v. Denno. In Jackson, the United States Supreme Court
examined the three prevailing modes for admitting confessions-
the New York rule,' the Massachusetts rule' and the orthodox
'378 U.S. 368 (1964), noted 18 Sw. L.J. 729 (1964).
Under the New York rule, the trial judge must make a preliminary determina-
tion regarding a confession offered by the prosecution and exclude it if in no
circumstances could the confession be deemed voluntary. But if the evidence
presents a fair question as to its voluntariness, as where certain facts bearing
on the issue are in dispute or where reasonable men could differ over the infer-
ences to be drawn from undisputed facts, the judge "must receive the con-
fession and leave to the jury, under proper instructions, the ultimate determi-
nation of its voluntary character and also its truthfulness." Id. at 377, quoting
from Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
[ T]he judge himself hears the confession evidence, himself resolves evidentiary
conflicts and gives his own answer to the coercion issue, rejecting confessions
he deems involuntary and admitting only those he believes voluntary. It is
only the latter confessions that are heard by the jury, which may then, under
this procedure, disagree with the judge, find the confession involuntary and
ignore it. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 378 (1964).
In Smith, the federal district court said: "Under the Massachusetts procedure, it is
immaterial that the jury is present when the predicate for admissibility of the confession
is laid, for once the confession is found voluntary and admitted, the jury only hears what
it would have heard anyway." 236 F. Supp. at 861 n. 9.
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rule'-and found the New York rule inadequate to protect a defend-
ant's constitutional right not to be convicted on the basis of a coerced
confession. The orthodox rule was expressly and the Massachusetts rule
impliedly approved! In Smith, the federal court looked at Texas
precedents and found that, before Jackson, it was within the dis-
cretion of the trial judge to determine which of the two procedures
(New York or Massachusetts) he would follow. This opened the door
for examination of the record and the taking of testimony by the
trial judge as to which procedure was, in fact, followed. The court,
upon finding that the Massachusetts rule had been used and that no
request had been made by the defendant to conduct the hearing
under that rule outside the presence of the jury, dismissed the petition.
A recent decision of another federal district court also enunciated
this rule. In Rudolph v. Holman' the writ of habeas corpus was
granted where it was shown that the state trial court had denied de-
fendant's timely request to conduct the hearing in the absence of
the jury.
Also in apparent accord are the instructions given to trial courts
by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in two cases' which were
remanded to the Texas appeals court at the same time Jackson was
decided.8 It was held that in future Texas trials the judge should
make a clear-cut determination on voluntariness of confessions, in-
cluding disputed fact issues. "Upon request," said the court, "such
hearing shall be held . . . in the absence of the jury."9
R.G.R.
The court noted that a defendant might be reluctant to testify to coercion in the
presence of the jury because of his vulnerability to cross-examination and impeachment by
proof of prior convictions. But it said the defendant could not claim error on this account
unless he had requested to testify out of the presence of the jury and been denied. Id.
at 862.
"'In jurisdictions following the orthodox rule . . . the judge himself solely and finally
determines the voluntariness of the confession ....... .Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368,
378 (1964).
" 'We raise no question here concerning the Massachusetts procedure .... Given the
integrity of the preliminary proceedings before the judge, the Massachusetts procedure does
not, in our opinion, pose hazards to the rights of a defendant." Id. at 378 n. 8.
6236 F. Supp. 62 (M.D. Ala. 1964).
'Lopez v. State, 384 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964); Harris v. State, 384 S.W.2d
351 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
6 Lopez v. Texas, 378 U.S. 567 (1964); Harris v. Texas, 378 U.S. 572 (1964).
"Lopez v. State, 384 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
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Insurance -Omnibus Clause of Liability Policy -
Coverage of Buyer Under Conditional Sales Contract
Smith agreed to purchase an automobile from Bailey and Carpenter,
Inc. and entered into a sales contract with that firm which was to
become effective upon payment by the bank of a check which Smith
gave as a down payment. Smith took possession of the car. Upon
dishonor of the check, the seller telephoned Smith and verbally can-
celled the contract and demanded return of the car. A few days later,
Smith, while on his way to return the automobile to the seller,
negligently collided with the plaintiff's automobile. Plaintiff, after
obtaining a judgment against Smith, sued Bailey and Carpenter and
its insurer claiming that Smith was using the car with the permis-
sion of the seller and therefore was covered by the omnibus clause
of the liability policy issued by the insurer to Bailey and Carpenter.
The trial court awarded a judgment for the plaintiff but the court
of civil appeals reversed.! Held, affirmed: The possessor of property
who retains possession after the recission of a sales contract to him
is not a party using the property with the "permission" of the
insured even though a demand for immediate return of the property
has been made by the seller and the injury occurred when that de-
mand was being satisfied. Weatherford v. Aetna Ins. Co., 385 S.W.2d
381 (Tex. 1964).
The sales contract in the principal case provided for immediate
possession by the buyer but retention of title in the seller until the
check was honored by the bank. It is clear that a seller who is in-
duced by fraud to give up possession of his property is entitled to
rescind the sales contract under which he lost possession and to demand
return of the property.' The problem answered in the present case is
in what status does a fraudulent possessor act when he is acting
under the rightful owner's direction to return the property after
recission of the fraudulent contract of sale.
Although several courts have uniformly held the omnibus clause
not applicable to conditional buyers, this seems to be a case of first
impression on the question of applicability of the clause after the sales
contract has been rescinded by the seller but possession has not yet
been regained by the seller. The majority of the court based its
' The policy contained a standard "omnibus" or additional insured clause covering all
persons using the automobile with the permission of the insured.
2370 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
3Guinn v. Lokey, 151 Tex. 260, 249 S.W.2d 185 (1952).
4 Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Emmons, 122 Ind. App. 440, 104 N.E.2d 413 (1952);
Home Indem. Co. v. Bowers, 194 Tenn. 560, 253 S.W.2d 750 (1952). See also Annot.,
36 A.L.R.2d 673 (1954).
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opinion upon the theory that, although the buyer had a continuing
duty to return the automobile to the seller, the seller had no actual
physical control over it and, therefore, should not be held to have
given "permission" to Smith to drive the automobile when, in fact,
he was merely asserting his rights. The court stated that in order for
the owner to give his permission to another to drive the automobile,
thereby exposing his insurer to liability, he must have actual control
over the property and voluntarily relinquish it to another. In a dis-
senting opinion, Justice Greenhill asserted that the seller could have
acted to repossess the property himself but instead elected to demand
that the buyer return it and, therefore, should be held to have given
his permission by making that election.5
R.B.L.
Labor Law - Jurisdiction of NLRB Not Ousted by Pri-
vate Agreement
An agreement between the employer and the union to arbitrate
reinstatement rights of certain employees contained a clause making
the decision of the arbitration board final and binding. Recourse by
the parties to any appeal or review given by state or federal law was
specifically prohibited. Following an arbitration award in favor of
the employer, the union disregarded the terms of the agrement by
filing unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations
Board. The company subsequently petitioned a federal district court
requesting an order that the union withdraw its unfair labor practice
charges and be enjoined from attacking the arbitration award in any
other way. The court refused to grant the company relief. Held,
affirmed: The NLRB is granted jurisdiction by statute over unfair
labor practices, and such jurisdiction may not be preempted by private
agreement. Lodge 743, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. United Aircraft
Corp., 337 F.2d 5 (2nd Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 33 U.S.L. Week
3286 (U.S. Mar. 1, 1965).
Section 10 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act' empowers the
NLRB to prevent any person from engaging in unfair labor prac-
tices and expressly states that this power is not to be affected by any
other law or agreement. The United States Supreme Court has re-
5385 S.W.2d at 384.
161 Stat. 146 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958).
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flected its affirmation of this section's mandate in this way: "The
Board asserts a public right vested in it as a public body, charged in
the public interest with the duty of preventing unfair labor prac-
tices."' The company acknowledged that heretofore, due to the public
interest involved, the power vested in the NLRB to prevent unfair
labor practices could not be foreclosed by private agreement. It
contended, however, that three recent judicial trends demanded
reconsideration of this previously well-settled proposition.
The first trend was illustrated by cases in which parties were
allowed to waive by private agreement certain other rights given to
them by the National Labor Relations Act.' The court agreed that
some of the rights could be waived but said that they were not of the
magnitude of the one involved here and had not been given express
statutory protection.
As the second trend, the company pointed out the impressive line
of Supreme Court cases which demands that courts in reviewing
arbitration awards give great deference to them.4 Although the court
acknowledged the importance of enforcing contract rights and re-
iterated the policy of encouraging private settlement of labor dis-
putes, it reasoned that if the broad powers granted to the NLRB by
Congress were to be preserved, its jurisdiction must be protected. The
court also said that these cases, which set the tone for the courts to
follow in considering arbitration awards, did not apply to the NLRB
"which, unlike the courts, is charged with vindicating a body of
public rights set forth in the National Labor Relations Act."'
Finally, the company cited several cases which hold that enforce-
ment of private agreements under section 301 (a) of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Acte is not barred merely because the suit is also
'National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 364 (1940).
' A union may waive its right to obtain wage data and other employee information from
the employer for use in collective bargaining. NLRB v. Perkins Mach. Co., 326 F.2d 488
(1st Cir. 1964); Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1964).
A union, through a "no-raiding" agreement with another union, may waive its right to
petition the NLRB for certification as a collective bargaining agent. United Textile Workers
v. Textile Workers Union, 258 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1958); Local 2608, Lumber & Sawmill
Workers v. Millmen's Local 1495, 169 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Cal. 1958). Contra, International
Union of Doll & Toy Workers v. Metal Polishers Union, 180 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
4 The line was originated by the famous Steelworkers Trilogy. United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564 (1960). It has been continued in the last two terms of the Court by John Wiley &
Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964), and Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S.
650 (1965).
'337 F.2d at 10-11.
061 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1958). This section gives the federal district
courts the power to hear suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a union
or between two unions.
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within the jurisdiction of NLRB.' The court points out that although
these cases show that the jurisdiction given to the NLRB by section
10(a) will not always be exclusive, they do not mean that such
jurisdiction has been preempted entirely.
The court in the instant case, in upholding the letter of section
10 (a) of the act, indicates certain outside limitations upon the trend
to encourage settlement of labor disputes through bargaining and
arbitration which is established in the cases cited by the employer.
The court suggests that the NLRB, especially in the extreme cir-
cumstances of this case, should weigh heavily the merits of the arbi-
tration award. It quickly adds, however, that the Board shall retain
the power to make the final determination in all cases, including
those in which a private arbitration agreement would dictate other-
wise.
J.w.c.
Oil and Gas - Abandonment of Lease - Lessee's
Duty of Care
Plaintiff, fee owner of a large tract of land in an oil producing area,
leased to defendant under a standard form oil and gas lease. Some
problems had been experienced with wells on adjoining tracts due to
the influx of salt water. Pressure tests were being conducted by the
defendant on those tracts to determine the extent of damage done
to the pool. Before the results of these tests could be obtained, de-
fendant proceeded to clear the plaintiff's tract in preparation for
drilling thereon. The day after clearing procedures had been com-
menced the results of the tests were made known to the defendant,
who then temporarily ceased operations on the plaintiff's tract. Ap-
proximately two months later, defendant resumed operations and
completed the preparation for drilling. While this work was being
done, the wells on the adjoining tracts again began producing exces-
sive amounts of salt water. Defendant then decided to completely
abandon the plaintiff's tract, and drilling operations were never com-
menced. Plaintiff instituted the principal case to recover the loss in
value of his tract as a result of the clearing operations. Held: A lessor
may hold his lessee liable for damages to his tract caused by lessee's
7Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co.,
370 U.S. 238 (1962); Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
See also Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), which gives state courts
concurrent jurisdiction in this area.
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negligence in clearing the tract after he knew or should have known
that he would probably later abandon the lease without drilling. Sun
Oil Co. v. Nunnery, 170 So. 2d 24 (Miss. 1964).
This case presents a seemingly often raised but rarely litigated prob-
lem. The lessee in the principal case was admittedly justified in
abandoning or refusing to abandon the lease and for that act alone
could not be held liable for negligence under the well-established
prudent-operator test.' The court makes it clear, however, that the
lessee may violate that test by not abandoning operations at the
proper time. Lessee here, therefore, had the right to clear the lessor's
land and the right to abandon the lease, but was held to have no right
to clear the lessor's tract when he knew or should have known that
he probably would not drill.
The holding in the principal case represents a new approach to the
long-settled principle that a lessee under an ordinary oil and gas
lease has only those implied rights to use the surface as are reasonably
necessary to oil and gas production The court rejected the holding
in the only case cited as dealing with the same problem3 and based
liability in the principal case on the jury's finding of negligence. The
court, therefore, limited recovery to the amount which would re-
store the premises to its previous condition and compensate plaintiff
for the loss in productivity of the land during the period in which
the damage existed, thereby expressly rejecting the contention of the
lessor that the proper measure of damages should have been the loss
in the market value of the tract.
R.B.L.
Products Liability - Implied Warranty - Necessity
of a Sale
Defendant, a manufacturer of fork-lift trucks, provided plain-
tiff's employer with a new model fork lift as a demonstrator for the
purpose of encouraging future sales. Plaintiff, while operating the
lift, was injured when an overhead guard collapsed. The plaintiff
instituted suit claiming that the defendant had been negligent in
1 See 5 Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law § 861 (1964).
'Union Producing Co. v. Pittman, 245 Miss. 427, 146 So. 2d 553 (1962); Pure Oil Co.
v. Gear, 183 Okla. 489, 83 P.2d 389 (1938); Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin, 153 Tex.
465, 271 S.W.2d 410 (1954).
'Coffindaffer v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 74 W.Va. 107, 81 S.E. 966 (1914) (holding
that the abandoning operator committed a trespass ab initio when he entered the leased prop-
erty and constructed an access road and then abandoned the lease).
[Vol. 19
RECENT DECISIONS
affixing the guard to the lift and for breach of implied warranty of
the product. The jury found no negligence but held the defendant
strictly liable for breach of implied warranty. Defendant appealed.
Held, affirmed: A manufacturer may be held strictly liable for a
breach of the implied warranty of fitness of his product even though
it reached the public by some means other than sale. Delaney v. Tow-
motor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964).
It has been often held in the jurisdictions accepting the implied
warranty theory of products liability that once an original sale of a
product is effected the warranty implied by law in the sale runs to
any subsequent purchasers,1 users,' lessees3 or bailees" of the product.
The principal case eliminates the requirement of an initial sale. The
court stated:
We can see no sensible reason why Delaney's rights against Towmotor
should be less extensive on the facts here than if Towmotor had first
sold the [product] . . . to its distributor, or than if it had sold the
machine to [plaintiff's employer], . . . for a nominal down payment,
subject to return if [he] . . . was not satisfied after a trial period.5
The holding in the instant case makes it clear that the court, although
speaking in terms of implied warranty, applies tort and not tradi-
tional contract principles in a products liability case.' In doing so it
follows, in theory though not in words, the lead of the California
Supreme Court which has expressly adopted strict liability in tort as
the proper remedy in these cases." In applying that remedy, the basic
question to be answered by the court is one of proximate cause, and
questions of initial or subsequent sale become immaterial! The court
in the principal case, construing New York law, based its opinion on
a statement in the majority opinion in Goldberg v. Kollsman In-
strument Corp.,9 to the effect that strict liability in tort was a more
accurate phrase to describe the duty now being imposed upon the
manufacturer. In applying these principles, the court gives a very
'Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d
873 (1958).
2 Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963); Henningson v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
3Simpson v. Powered Prods, Inc., 24 Conn. Supp. 409, 192 A.2d 555 (C.P. 1963).4 Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962).
5 3 3 9 F.2d at 6.
1 The future application of tort principles in implied warranty cases was also indicated
in George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904
(1964), noted in 18 Sw. L.J. 756 (1964).
'Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod. Inc., 59 Cal.2d 67, 377 P.2d 897 (1963), noted in
17 Sw. L.J. 669 (1963). The New Jersey Supreme Court also recently adopted the strict
liability in tort doctrine in Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, 33 U.S.L. Week 2446 (N.J.
Feb. 17, 1965).
See 1 Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability § 16A [2] (2d ed. 1964).
12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
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significant interpretation to the language of section 402A (1) of the
Restatement of Torts." That section provides for the strict liability
of one who sells a defective product for injuries caused by that
product. The court holds that this is "a description of the situation
that has most commonly arisen rather than a deliberate limitation of
the principle to cases where the product has been sold.""
The vast majority of jurisdictions now apply the implied warranty
theory of products liability to at least some products." In these juris-
dictions the holding in the principal case can be used as a significant
precedent by courts attempting to evade traditional notions of con-
tractual warranty in products liability cases.
R.B.L.
Products Liability - Implied Warranty - Nonfood
Products
Plaintiff, while using a wheel chair rented from a local retail drug-
gist, suffered personal injuries when the chair collapsed due to a de-
fective fork stem connecting the wheel to the chair. The defendant-
manufacturer, a Pennsylvania corporation, purchased the defective
fork stem from a supplier, and assembled the stem into the wheel
chair sold to the retail druggist. The plaintiff alleged both negligence
and breach of implied warranties of fitness and merchantability.
After the district court granted defendant's motion to strike the
pleadings based on implied warranties because of lack of privity of
contract, the case was tried on the issue of negligence. Upon a jury
finding that the defendants were free from negligence, the district
court entered judgment for the defendants. Held, reversed: A manu-
facturer or assembler of an imminently dangerous defective product
is strictly liable to the user for an injury caused by the defect, even
though the product is not a food for human consumption, there is
no proof of negligence and there is no privity of contract between
the user and the manufacturer or assembler. Putman v. Erie City
Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (sth Cir. 1964).
The Fifth Circuit, interpreting Texas law, stated that this re-
sult was a logical extension of Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps.1
The Decker case established that, as a matter of public policy in
10Restatement (Second), Torts § 402A(1) (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
"3 39 F.2d at 6.
12 1 Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability § 16.04 [2] (2d ed. 1964).
' 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
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a food products case, a warranty of fitness for human consump-
tion is implied by law and privity of contract is not a requisite to
recovery. Although the doctrine of implied warranty in nonfood
cases has not yet been expressly established by the Texas state courts,
the reasoning presented in Decker for strict liability for food pro-
ducts was held in the instant case to be applicable to a wheel chair;
that is, the non-negligent manufacturer should bear the burden be-
cause of the inability of the consumer to inspect or analyze the pro-
duct and the capacity of the manufacturer to best bear the cost of
protecting the public from injury. Putting such an unreasonably
dangerous product in the stream of commerce was held to be viola-
tive of a strong public policy to protect human life and health.
The Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, in Ford Motor Co. v.
Mathis,' held liable an automobile manufacturer- assembler who was
not in privity with the purchaser and who could not have dis-
covered the defect in an independently supplied part by reasonable
inspection. Though the manufacturer's liability in Mathis was pre-
dicated on negligence, the opinion contained strong language of
implied warranty heralding the result of the instant case. The court
here, as in Mathis, held the imminently dangerous doctrine, which
eliminates the necessity of privity of contract between the parties, to
be applicable. Imminently dangerous products were defined as those
which are not inherently dangerous when properly constructed.
Since 1958, nearly every court which has considered the question
has extended the doctrine of strict liability to cover all imminently
dangerous defective products, regardless of proof of negligence.' The
court concluded, therefore, that "it would be 'gratuitous and unwar-
ranted' to assume that the forward-looking Supreme Court of Texas,
which in Decker was one of the leaders in the assault on the citadel
of privity, would now hold that privity is required in nonfood
cases. . ."' It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court of Texas
will be so disposed.
C.W.M.
Though no Texas court has made this extension, the court noted that the Decker
case had been extensively relied upon by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), which applied strict liability
to a nonfood product (a defective automobile). It was further noted that a federal dis-
trict court in New York, applying the substantive law of Texas, could find no valid reason
for distinguishing between food and imminently dangerous nonfood products, and held
that privity was not a requisite for recovery. Siegel v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 860
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
3 3 2 2 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963), noted in 18 Sw. L.J. 128 (1964).
4 See cases cited 338 F.2d at 919-20 n. 19. But see Berry v. American Cyanamid Co., 341
F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1965) (applying Tennessee law).
5 1d. at 923.
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Substitution of Parties - Statute of Limitations -
Relation-Back Doctrine
Plaintiff's decedent, a nonresident, was killed October 18, 1959,
in Yamhill County, Oregon. Plaintiff was appointed administrator
of decedent's estate in Multnomah County, Oregon, and brought a
wrongful death action on April 26, 1961. On November 9, 1961, de-
fendants moved in the Multnomah County probate court to set aside
plaintiff's appointment as administrator on the grounds that decedent
was a nonresident and left no assets in that county. After the appoint-
ment was set aside, plaintiff was appointed administrator in Yamhill
County and amended his complaint in the wrongful death action to
reflect this change. Held: Where plaintiff was appointed administra-
tor in a county in which the nonresident decedent had no assets,
such appointment was a nullity, and where an original complaint had
been filed prior to the running of the statute of limitations which had
to be amended after the statute had run when the plaintiff was
appointed in the proper county, the cause of action was barred.
Richard v. Slate, 396 P.2d 900 (Ore. 1964).
Under the strict common law rule, if plaintiff made a mistake in
the persons he named as parties to a suit, any attempt to rectify this
by amendment constituted initiation of a new suit.' Modern statutes
and rules of procedure generally allow amendments to be made so
long as the real parties in interest and the cause of action remain the
same.' Also common today is the application of the "relation-back"
doctrine. Under this doctrine, acts of a personal representative of a
decedent, prior to his valid appointment, which were beneficial to
the estate and would have been within the scope of his authority had
he been duly qualified, are validated upon his appointment Despite
the apparent weight of authority to the contrary,' the Oregon court
held in the instant case that, before his appointment as administrator
in the proper county, the plaintiff was a "stranger to the [wrongful
death] action."' His amended pleading after proper appointment
was, thus, the "commencement of a new action, '" then barred by the
1 See Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 6 (1949).
'See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 (a) and (c); Tex. R. Civ. P. 63.
'Globe Acc. Ins. Co. v. Gerisch, 163 Ill. 625, 45 N.E. 563 (1896).
'Petsel v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 202 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1953) (applying Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15); Williams v. Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Co., 111 Kan. 34, 206 Pac. 327 (1922);
King v. Solomon, 232 Mass. 326, 81 N.E.2d 838 (1948); Ghilain v. Couture, 84 N.H.
48, 146 Atl. 395 (1929); Graves v. Welborn, 260 N.C. 688, 133 S.E.2d 761 (1963);
Douglas v. Daniels Bros. Coal Co., 135 Ohio St. 641, 22 NE.2d 195 (1939); Cockerham
v. Potts, 143 Ore. 80, 20 P.2d 423 (1933).




two-year statute. The wrongful death action, the court emphasized,
is a new liability unknown at common law, and conditions for bring-
ing it are limitations on the substantive right.
One justice dissented at length, deploring the majority's refusal
to apply the relation-back doctrine. By this approach he said, "the
courts deem that the amended complaint was filed on the day of the
original complaint ... [and] the plaintiff is given a day in court
and is not rejected on a mere technicality." "The development which
bars the running of the limitation period," it was insisted, "is not
the appointment of an administrator but the filing of a complaint
which avers in the plaintiff a cause of action against the defendant."'
R.G.R.
Wills - Ademption of Specific Devises
Testator executed a will in 1949 when he owned various un-
divided interests in five tracts of land. He therein devised all of these
interests to his six children. Two of testator's sons were the cotenants
with him in the tracts. In 1950 and 1957, testator and his sons made
various cross-conveyances by which he became the fee owner of the
two tracts in which he had previously held a one-third interest in
exchange for his interests in the other three tracts and the assumption
of certain debts. He did not thereafter revise his will. Upon probate
of the 1949 will, the trial court held that the children received only
the one-third interest in the two remaining tracts which the testator
owned when he executed the will and that the two-thirds interest in
the two tracts received in the conveyances passed to the testator's
widow under the residuary clause. The children appealed. Held,
affirmed: (1) The devise of the interests was a specific devise of the
parcels of realty, (2) the conveyances of 1950 and 1957 were not
mere voluntary partitions of the realty, (3) parol evidence of the
testator's intent is not admissible to prevent ademption, and (4) the
devises to the children of the interests in the three torts were adeemed
when the cross conveyances took place. Rogers v. Carter, 385 S.W.2d
563 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
The principal case goes far to clarify the doctrine of ademption by
extinction of specific bequests and devises in Texas. The court recog-
7 id. at 906.
8 id. at 908.
'Previous Texas cases concerning ademption have been few and have established only
that the most basic concepts of the doctrine would be recognized. See, e.g., Smith v. Good,
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nizes the well-established rule that for an ademption of a devise to be
effected the devise in question must be of "specific" property and not
merely "demonstrative" of the wishes of the testator! The devise in
the principal case was of the testator's intrests in five particularly-
described tracts which clearly constituted a specific devise. The ap-
pellants' main contention was that the cross-conveyances of the
testator and his sons were only voluntary partitions of undivided
interests in realty among cotenants and, therefore, were not actual
conveyances of a kind which would cause ademption' The court
recognized the validity of this exception to the ademption doctrine
but noted that the conveyances here involved where not merely ex-
changes of an undivided interest in an entire single tract for a fee
in a portion of that tract. The court considered as determinative the
facts that in the conveyances other consideration in addition to the
land passed between the parties and that the testator did not take
merely a portion of each separate tract in fee but instead exchanged
his undivided partial interest in three tracts for a fee interest in the
other two.
The appellants also claimed that certain statements made by the
testator which indicated his intent that the devises to the children
should not be adeemed should have been admitted into evidence in
the trial court. This contention was also rejected by the court in
accordance with the modern view that the testator's intention as to
the ademption of a devise is immaterial4 and that extrinsic or parol
evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of a will.'
R.B.L.
119 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error ref.; Burch v. McMillin, 15 S.W.2d 86
(Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
'6 Bowe & Parker, Page on Wills § 54.4-7 (1962). For a definition and discussion of
these terms see Houston Land & Trust Co. v. Campbell, 105 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937) error ref., and Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 778 (1959).
aBrady v. Paine, 391 Ill. 596, 63 N.E.2d 721 (1945); In re Mullendore's Estate, 297
P.2d 1094 (Okla. 1956). These cases hold that if a partition occurs the devisee will receive
the full partitioned interest.
'6 Bowe & Parker, Page on Wills S 54.15 (1962).
'Huffman v. Huffman, 161 Tex. 267, 339 S.W.2d 885 (1960).
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